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PANEL I: DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPT
NATHANIEL BERMAN: Well, I think both papers went
from the detail of the regulatory changes in Europe to address
some of the larger concerns. Professor Burkert brought us to
the democracy problem in Europe and Professors Mayer-
Sch6nberger and Lazer addressed the distribution of power
among regulatory instances in Europe and the United States.
And I look forward to Professor Verhulst's commentary on all
this.
STEFAAN VERHULST: Thanks for the presentation of two
wonderful papers. As a commentator, it is always difficult to
comment. I had a brief conversation with Professor Frankel,
which clearly indicated that you can never trash them, but you
can also never improve them, and that is the difficulty of a
commentator.
And so I am going to try to make some - on the one hand -
comparison lessons, because we are talking about European
developments in a U.S. setting. So, we have the automatic
tendency to compare. What I would like to do is try to create
some comparative frameworks and touch upon differences or at
least some comparative terms, and then I would also like to
come back to the interdependencies of governance and look at
what they are, or at least, the problems that a global EU and
U.S. encounter. I probably only have five minutes, but it is im-
portant in addressing the comparative questions to indicate
certain safety warnings when you develop a comparative
framework, and also reflect the safety warnings that are appli-
cable when you start actually exchanging information based
upon the interdependencies of information, as expressed ear-
lier. This is due to the difficulty in drawing lessons from dif-
ferent legal cultures and making comparisons.
The first difficulty of the first complexity that you should be
aware of is the use of different terminology. For instance, the
use of telecommunications law might already reflect certain
differences between the U.S. and Europe - quite often in the
U.S., under the umbrella of telecommunications policy and law,
you find broadcasting, which is something you will never find
within an EU setting. So, the terminology of the sectors and
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systems are often really different. Of course, you have to be
aware of fundamental legal differences between legal cultures.
You also have to be aware of the tendency of the comparatists
to rely on one's own legal concept. As the focus of this panel is
the European experience, my comparison will also emphasize
differences in the European context.
There is a tendency to see common patterns, a typical ele-
ment in making comparisons. There is also a tendency to ig-
nore the larger picture, which quite often explains the differ-
ences between the various legal cultures, and you have to be
aware of the speed of change of those legal cultures, which was
indicated by both papers already. If we have those safety
warnings, then I can start developing a comparative frame-
work. You should be aware of the safety warnings, whatever
conclusions you make within that comparative framework.
The first element that is important to emphasize is that both
the U.S. and the European Union use a different vision to-
wards actually regulating the communication space. And
sometimes they actually fail to emphasize, but at least they
both use different metaphors within that whole spectrum of
regulating communications and developing communication
policies.
If you look at the relevant directorate that is in charge of
telecommunications law, you see the metaphor that is used
within Europe to regulate communications in the information
society, which is fundamentally different than any metaphor
used within the U.S. to actually regulate or develop telecom-
munications policies.
There is metaphor these days. There was one a few years ago
when you had the whole fuss about the super-highways. But
clearly those metaphors and models have somehow disap-
peared within the debate in the U.S. about telecommunications
regulation, which is not the case when you look at European
Union developments that clearly have an information society
model in mind, and also have a certain tendency to implement
those metaphors.
The second element, the element of focus - something that
has substantially changed within the European Union as a re-
sult of the new framework, and the focus tends to be more
technologically neutral - was emphasized by Professor Burk-
ert's paper, especially where touches upon the notions of inter-
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connection and access, which is quite an important difference
that indeed there is a technologically neutral approach within
the European Union these days. When you look at notions of
interconnection and access, which is still different in the U.S.,
where you have some kind of a classification of dichotomies...
telecom cable ... which is again a difference from the Euro-
pean Union which leads to a whole array. This is, of course, a
law school, a whole array of litigations, based upon those classi-
fications - and you can have a look at the broadband debate -
which ultimately delayed the implementation of specific laws
and have a major impact on the debate. That element of fun-
damental litigation based upon those dichotomies is not pre-
sent, or less present, within the European Union debate and is
an important distinction to be made.
Another element of comparison is the legal scope and ...
what I mean here is the balance between competition law and
sector specific law. That balance has changed again within the
European Union, as a result of this new communications
framework in which - and again, Professor Burkert has em-
phasized - you have more implementation or more emphasis
on the competition law, general competition law element, and
you see integration within telecommunications law of general
competition law principles such as definition of the significant
market power. This balance was already different within the
U.S. There was traditionally more emphasis on competition
law . . . anti-trust law elements when it came to certain ele-
ments of telecommunications regulation, which is, again, im-
portant from a comparative perspective.
Another element is the scope, besides the legal scope, but
also the general scope and focus and the level of intervention.
The European Union tends, as you can see within the very
complex communications framework, to be very comprehensive
when it does things. This is quite often in conflict with the
whole notion of solidarity and proportionality within the Euro-
pean Union, but the EU tends to be rather comprehensive and
tries to indicate or include every single element that it sees to
be important, which is perhaps different again within the U.S.
setting, where it is more an ad hoc intervention on a regular
basis. This is also, of course, related with some notions of the
light-touch type of regulations.
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Then, again, it is important to emphasize that this communi-
cations framework is also an attempt to make a distinction in a
converged environment between content and conveyance. This
is also taking place within a U.S. setting, but is still merged
within the FCC, which is a different approach than what the
European Union is doing, whether it is really a distinction be-
tween content and conveyance also institutionally. And that's
also an important comparative conclusion perhaps.
Then another element and a last element, which I want to
touch upon here, which is interesting from a comparative per-
spective, is indeed the whole notion of the public interest -
how it is defined and expanded within the European Union
framework. This refers to notions of universal service, users
rights and consumer protection ... and especially also ... con-
sumer protection and users rights, which as you can see is very
elaborate in the current communications/telecommunications
framework and which is to a certain extent absent - not com-
pletely absent - but there is anyway some kind of taboo within
the telecommunications debate from at least the FCC perspec-
tive to touch upon those issues these days. Anyway, you have,
of course, FCC Commissioner Michael Powell, who has those
famous speeches about whether there is actually a public inter-
est and so on, which is unthinkable within a European Union
setting, and an important comparative perspective.
And then just one element on what Professor Burkert said at
the end with regard to localizing universal service. I can't
agree more to have universal service as a moving target, and
depending upon the target, you should have some kind of a dif-
ferent policy with regard to universal service. This target may
change, of course, according to the region . . . or could change
according to the region and the local environments.
Some general lessons from both the U.S. and the European
Union is that deregulation, the title of this panel, ultimately
leads to, not less, but definitely equal, or even more rules and
frameworks. The whole complex setting of deregulation is al-
ready an indication of the end result.
Another important lesson is that liberalization both within
the U.S. and within the European Union setting has quite often
led to some kind of regulatory opportunism, which then leads
to the pollution that Professor Burkert has indicated, and quite
often also leads to actual real market distortions following lib-
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eralization. These are important lessons to be learned. Every-
one knows that, and that is of course, the problem of the infor-
mational interdependency - there is a difference between
knowing something and acting upon it.
The other comment I would like to add to the interdepen-
dency debate and the question of centralized/decentralized gov-
ernance is: Should it be global versus local, and in the Euro-
pean Union debate should it be European versus Member State
based? Perhaps it is also important to look at what problems
they have tried to solve.
Depending upon the problems you try to solve, you can make
a distinction between the need for a global governance struc-
ture and the need for more locally based governance structures;
basically if you look at the global governance structures, then
there is the tendency for the governance structures to be cre-
ated as a result of three types of problems that they want to
solve.
The first type of problem they want to solve, and hence has
led to the creation of those cross-border governance structures,
is coordination. If there is a fundamental need for coordination
in specific fields because of the need for compatibility - for
instance, in the standards fields - then you will have a ten-
dency and.., a governance solution to its more global type of
coordination and institutional framework.
The second type of problem that leads to some kind of need
for global governance is what you can title the so-called "com-
mons problems," which then refers to trying to manage or gov-
ern common resources, which don't stop at the borders and
which are generally conceived as public goods. Here again, you
can have a whole day debate on what are public goods, and are
public goods also moving targets depending upon certain devel-
opments. The whole debate is whether you can have, for in-
stance, the same perspective that you have as a spectrum,
which is sometimes perceived as a common resource, and you
have the same debate within an Internet setting. That is
transferred anyway, then you have the automatic tendency to
think in global governance terms.
The third type of problem, interdependency, is actually more
value based. Quite often you see the creation of global govern-
ance structures because there is a tendency to protect call val-
ues across borders. And then, look at the UN and so on - basi-
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cally wide spaced global governance solutions. The question is:
What types of rights and core values do we have within the
whole communications debate? You can automatically think of
some, and the question is: Are these to be protected at a global
level? Then you can add the digital divide to that, and see
whether that ultimately may change the whole telecom debate.
Anyway, all those global problems which lead to the need for
some kind of global governance structures may ultimately lead
to some kind of international institutions, and the ultimate
question is whether there needs to be some experimentation
here in order to address those global problems that ultimately
blend. Then come back to Professor Burkert, and the blend, a
certain notion of effectiveness of policy making with democratic
accountability, which then also may be the basis for the next
panel around ICANN, which is the fundamental question.
NATHANIEL BERMAN: Thank you very much for those
comments .... I think there are two very broad things that the
papers have brought out: Both the distribution of power be-
tween various regulatory authorities, and the problems of de-
mocracy that were highlighted by Professor Burkert and Pro-
fessors Schonberger and Lazer, as well as the question of com-
parative conceptualization of the very issues that the regula-
tory authorities have to deal with, value choices as well as an
understanding of the very conceptual distinctions that are at
stake here.... So, I want to thank our panelists for both a very
informative, and also very provocative set of remarks.
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